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UNTANGLING ENTANGLEMENT
STEPHANIE H. BARCLAY*
ABSTRACT

The Court has increasingly signaled its interest in taking a more
historical approach to the Establishment Clause. And in its recent American
Legion decision, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the three-prong
Lemon test is essentially dead letter. Such a result would make sense for the
first two prongs of the Lemon test about secular purpose and the effects.
Many scholars have observed that these aspects of the prong are judicial
creations far afield of the Establishment Clause history. But what of the
entanglement prong of the test? If we rejected all applications of this prong
of the analysis, would we be essentially throwing the baby out with the
bathwater? This Article cautions that this might be the case.
A close analysis of the Court's entanglement jurisprudence, compared
against historical support for the various applications, suggests that
entanglement jurisprudence ought to remain good law in at least two
contexts. First, where it has protected religious groups from government
interference with the autonomy, internal affairs, and administration.
Second, where it prevents government from treating certain religious
groups in a preferential way, including by granting monopoly power in the
performance of public functions. On the other hand, the Court's
entanglement precedent is on far shakier historical ground in several
contexts, including anti-sectarian skepticism of any sort of government aid
to religious groups (and accompanying monitoring requirements to avoid
religious use of funds), concerns about political divisiveness when
government interacts with religious groups, and opposition to government
classifications necessary to provide religious exemptions. If the Court were
to modify its entanglement analysis to disregard ahistorical applications
and embrace the historical ones, the upshot would be far less apparent
tension between the Religion Clauses. Such an interpretation could
facilitate an increase in religious pluralism and human flourishing and a
decrease in unnecessary cultural fights aimed at excluding religion.from the
public sphere.
•
Associate Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School. For helpful comments, the author
thanks Ashutosh Bhagwat, Marc DeGirolami, Chad Flanders, Richard Garnett, Gabrielle Girgis, Luke
Goodrich, Michael Helfand, John Inazu, Christopher Lund, Michael McConnell, and James Phillips. For
excellent research assistance, the author thanks James Lee and Shawn Nevers. The author has served as
counsel in some of the cases discussed in this Article, but the views expressed in this Article do not
necessarily reflect the views of any parties in any case or of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.
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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision in American Legion, 1
scholars have begun to debate the fate of the infamous Lemon 2 test. Six of
the justices in American Legion seem to be in favor of rejecting the Lemon
test to some extent. Justice Alita (joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Breyer, Justice Kagan, and Justice Kavanaugh) criticized Lemon in the
context of symbol cases,3 Justice Kavanaugh stated that "[American Legion]
again makes clear that the Lemon test does not apply to Establishment
Clause cases, " 4 Justice Gorsuch suggested that Lemon is effectively
"shelved," 5 and Justice Thomas went as far as to say that the Court should
"overrule the Lemon test in all contexts." 6 Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh
argued that Lemon should no longer be good law, 7 and Justice Thomas
favored expressly overruling Lemon. 8 A plurality opinion observed that the
I.
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
2.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3.
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085 (longstanding religious displays have a "strong presumption
of constitutionality"); id. at 2084-85 ("A government that roams the land, tearing down monuments with
religious symbolism and scrubbing away any reference to the divine will strike many as aggressively
hostile to religion.").
4.
Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
5.
Id. at 2102 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
6.
Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
7.
Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at 2101 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
8.
Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Lemon Court's "ambitious[] attempt[] to find a grand unified theory of the
Establishment Clause" has given way to "a more modest approach that
focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for guidance." 9
In particular, the Court criticized the first two prongs of the Lemon test,
focused on secular purpose and the effect of a law. 10 Scholars such as
Michael McConnell have similarly sharply critiqued the first two prongs of
the Lemon test, as "several steps removed from the actual experiences that
lay behind the [original] decision to deny the government authority to erect
or maintain an establishment ofreligion." 11
Despite these clear criticisms of Lemon's first two prongs, the Court left
the status of Lemon's third entanglement prong much less clear.12 And the
Court just relied on entanglement concerns in a case decided this term. 13 It
thus appears that the entanglement strand of the Lemon analysis remains
good law to some extent. But in which contexts, and why? Many scholars
and jurists have argued that the Supreme Court should abandon
entanglement analysis altogether, describing the test as incoherent,
nonsensical, empty, and paradoxical. 14 Others have argued that
9.
Id. at 2087 (plurality opinion).
I 0.
Id. (majority opinion) (alleged establishments ofreligion "express many purposes and convey
many different messages, both secular and religious" (emphasis added)); id. at 2084 (because "time's
passage imbues a religiously expressive monument, symbol, or practice with ... historical significance,
removing it may no longer appear neutral, especially to the local community for which it has taken on
particular meaning").
11.
Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment a/Religion, 44 WM. & MARYL. REV. 2105, 2205-06 (2003).
12.
See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080 (plurality opinion) ("If the Lemon Court thought that its
test would provide a framework for all future Establishment Clause decisions, its expectation has not
been met."); see id. at 2081-82; id. at 2087 (plurality opinion) (opting to set aside Lemon by "tak[ing) a
more modest approach that focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for guidance");
id. (citing cases where the Court had "conspicuously ignored Lemon").
13.
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berm, No. 19-267, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3547, at *39
(U.S. July 8, 2020) (noting that allowing courts to decide who qualifies as a co-religionist "would risk
judicial entanglement in religious issues").
14.
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I adhere to ...
doubts about the entanglement test .... "), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109-10 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the entanglement test);
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)
(describing the entanglement test as "at once both insolubly paradoxical" and a "blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier" (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971))); Edward McGlynn Gaffney,
Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and
Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 205, 230 (1980); Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the
Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3,
19 (1979) ("The entanglement part of the Court's triad is either empty or nonsensical."); Gary J. Simson,
The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
905, 933 (1987) (arguing that the entanglement doctrine "should be eliminated"); David E. Steinberg,
Alternatives to Entanglement, 80 KY. L.J. 691, 692 (1991) ("This Article argues that the Court should
end its commitment to the entanglement prong, because the Court's entanglement inquiry is not coherent
and conflicts with established constitutional principles.").
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entanglement has served as "a blessing in disguise for religious choice and
diversity." 15
The Supreme Court has insisted that the doctrines governing
Establishment Clause questions look to the "specific practice[s]" of
history. 16 The question this Article explores, then, is whether any of the
Court's entanglement jurisprudence finds support in the historical record
regarding establishment of religions. Part I of this Article traces the
evolution of the Court's entanglement jurisprudence and identifies at least
six categories in which entanglement has taken on unique meaning. Part II
of this Article untangles which of these applications seems to be more
grounded in historical evidence about original concerns that led to an
Establishment Clause and which applications are ahistorical judicial
creations. It concludes that entanglement analysis fits with the historical
record in two primary contexts: First, when it has protected religious groups
from government interference with the autonomy, internal affairs, and
administration. Second, entanglement analysis finds historical support
where it prevents government from treating certain religious groups in a
preferential way, including by granting monopoly power in the performance
of public functions. While the Court need not continue these lines of cases
under the label of "entanglement," this Article argues that this jurisprudence
should remain good law. On the other hand, the Court's entanglement
precedent is on far shakier historical ground in several contexts, including
anti-sectarian skepticism of any sort of government aid to religious groups
(and accompanying monitoring requirements to avoid religious use of
funds), concerns about political divisiveness when government interacts
with religious groups, and opposition to government classifications
necessary to provide religious exemptions. Part III then explores the
implications of modifying entanglement to conform to a historical approach,
including how using history as a guide would curtail applications of the law
that seemingly place the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause in
tension.

15.
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at
a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 143 (1992).
16.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565,577 (2014). As of 2006, "76% of the Justices
who have written at least one Religion Clause opinion have appealed to history [i.e., specific founders
or the founding era], and every one of the twenty-three Justices who authored more than four Religion
Clause opinions have done so." Mark David Hall, Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian lines: The
Supreme Court ·s Use of History in Religion Clause Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 563, 572 (2006).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF ENTANGLEMENT ANALYSIS
This Part traces the evolution of the Court's entanglement jurisprudence
and identifies at least six categories in which entanglement has taken on
unique meaning: anti-sectarian roots, religious autonomy or interference
with internal church functions, Lemon's prophylactic entanglement related
to public support of religion, political entanglement, entanglement with
public functions, and the Court's meandering entanglement approach to
religious exemptions.
A. The Anti-Sectarian Roots ofEntanglement
The legal concept of entanglement has a somewhat dubious pedigree at
the Supreme Court. Entanglement is now most commonly associated with
the three-prong Lemon test, created in 1971. 17 But it is the 1948 decision in
Illinois ex rel. McCollum that marks the Supreme Court's first use of
"entanglement" as a legal test to assess Establishment Clause violations. 18
There, the Court struck down an optional program parents could consent to
which involved release time and religious education for students. 19 The
education program was offered by a voluntary association, which had been
formed by "interested members of the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and a few
of the Protestant faiths. " 20
In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter asserted the principle that
"the public school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the
strife of sects."21 In the case before it, the Court found this sort of
problematic entanglement because "the State's tax-supported public school
buildings" were being used by the religious program "for the dissemination
ofreligious doctrines," and the state provided aid to the program in the form
of the State's "school machinery." 22 The Court determined that this was not
a "separation of Church and State."23
To justify the position that this public support was problematic, Justice
Frankfurter stated, "[B]y 1875 the separation of public education from
Church entanglements, of the State from the teaching of religion, was finnly
established in the consciousness of the nation."24 Justice Frankfurter then
17.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
18.
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948); id. at 217
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
19.
Id. at 207-12 (majority opinion).
20.
Id. at 207.
21.
Id. at 216--17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22.
Id. at 212 (majority opinion).
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 217 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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quoted a speech by President Grant advocating for the federal Blaine
Amendment, which would have prohibited public funding of "sectarian"
schools. 25 In this speech, President Grant stated, "I predict that the dividing
line [in our country] will not be Mason and Dixon's, but between patriotism
and intelligence on the one side and superstition, ambition and ignorance on
the other."26 This opinion also quoted approvingly President Grant's next
statement, that "neither the State nor nation, nor both combined, shall
support institutions of learning other than those sufficient to afford every
child growing up in the land the opportunity of a good common school
education, unmixed with sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas." 27 Justice
Frankfurter also noted that "every State admitted into the Union since 1876
was compelled by Congress to write into its constitution a requirement that
it maintain a school system 'free from sectarian control. "'28
Congress ultimately narrowly failed to pass the "Blaine Amendment." 29
But it did pass a law which stated it "to be the settled policy of the
Government to hereafter make no appropriation whatever for education in
any sectarian school."30 And it was this same sort of policy that Justice
Frankfurter was praising in McCollum. 31 This embrace of pro-Blaine
rhetoric is no longer consistent with the Court's current approach. 32 In 2000,
the Court observed that Blaine amendments "arose at a time of pervasive
hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an
open secret that 'sectarian' was code for 'Catholic."' 33 The Court described
Blain Amendments as arising from "a shameful pedigree"34 and a "doctrine,
born of bigotry. " 35 And the Court has since upheld government aid to
churches, 36 including church schools, so long as parents and students had
private choice in the matter. 37 In its recent Espinoza case, the Court held that
government is in fact required to provide support for religious schools if it
Id. at 218.
Ulysses S. Grant, U.S. President, President Grant's Des Moines Address (Sept. 29, 1875), in
3 ANNALS OF IOWA 138, 139 ( 1897).
27.
McCol/um, 333 U.S. at 218 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The President's Speech at
Des Moines, 22 CATHOLIC WORLD 433, 434-35 (1876)).
28.
Id. at 220 (quoting Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676,677).
29.
See, e.g., Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38,
38 (1992).
30.
Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 79.
31.
See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 218 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The President's Speech
at Des Moines, supra note 27).
32.
See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3518, at *24
(U.S. June 30, 2020) (quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
33.
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828.
34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 829.
36.
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017).
37.
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,662 (2002).

25.
26.
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offers support for private secular schools. 38 Yet perhaps unwittingly, the
Court had, until very recently in its Espinoza decision, continued to
perpetuate the anti-Sectarian origins of Blaine in an entanglement analysis
exhibiting skepticism of any public support of religion.
B. The Pivot to Religious Autonomy
The Court's entanglement jurisprudence next expanded to include an
approach focused on protecting the autonomy of the religious organization
in Walz v. Tax Commission, which rejected an Establishment Clause
challenge to New York's property tax exemption for church property. 39 The
majority opinion in Walz held that New York's tax exemption was
permissible because it recognized "the autonomy and freedom of religious
bodies," and it "create[d] only a minimal and remote involvement between
church and state[,] . . . far less than taxation of churches.',4° So in this
instance, the Court held that there could be "benevolent neutrality" between
church and state "without sponsorship and without interference.',4 1
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Walz took a similar position, but
he reached his conclusion by emphasizing that the exemption's
"administration [would] not entangle government in difficult classifications
of what is or is not religious," in part because the exemption covered "broad
and divergent groups. " 42 This alternative notion of entanglement was more
fully developed in Texas Monthly, which involved a Texas sales tax that
applied to all secular publications, but exempted "[pJeriodicals that [were]
published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist[ ed] wholly of
writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist[ ed]
wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith.',4 3 Justice Brennan's opinion
noted the entanglement problem inherent in the statute. Specifically, it
"requires that public officials determine whether some message or activity
is consistent with 'the teaching of the faith. "' 44 Justice Brennan thus
concluded that although taxing churches would also "enmesh the operations
of church and state to some degree," enforcing the exemption would
38.
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3518, at *20, *31 (U.S.
June 30, 2020) ("Montana's no-aid provision discriminates based on religious status .... A State need
not subsidize private education. But once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private
schools solely because they are religious.").
39.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
40.
Id. at 672, 676.
41.
Id. at 669-70.
42.
Id. at 696--698 (Harlan, J ., concurring).
43.
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (plurality opinion) (first alteration in
original) (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (1982)).
44.
Id. at 20.
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"produce greater state entanglement with religion than the denial of an
exemption. ,,4s
According to Professor Zelinsky, these cases mark the beginning of an
important distinction in what he calls the Court's "'entanglement'
moniker."46 In particular, Professor Zelinsky argues that the majority
opinion in Walz addresses the entanglement problem that results from
government's "enforcement-related" activities (such as taxes), which affect
"the internal 'autonomy' of religious institutions.',4 7 Justice Harlan's
opinion in Walz and the majority opinion in Texas Monthly focused on the
entanglement problems at the "borderline" of government action, when
government must police the boundaries of who qualifies for an exemption
and who does not. 48
In a somewhat similar posture to these cases dealing with administrative
entanglement, Justice Brennan also recognized that the religious clauses
require that "all organs of government [maintain] a strict neutrality toward
theological questions. " 49 More specifically, courts may not inquire into the
merits of or otherwise weigh the value of or monitor religious organizations'
doctrines,
including
prayers, 50
sermons, 51 doctrine, 52
internal
54
53
55
administration, faith, and discipline. As the Tenth Circuit explained,
"Properly understood, the doctrine protects religious institutions from
governmental monitoring or second-guessing of their religious beliefs and

45.
Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
46.
Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Tax Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the
Establishment Clause? The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion and the Religious
Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the FICA and Self-Employment Taxes, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 1633, 1641-42 (2012).
47.
Id. at 1641-42.
48.
Id. at 1640-45.
49.
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,243 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
50.
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962) (striking down mandatory school prayer,
stating that religion should be left "to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to
for religious guidance").
51.
See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (Jehovah's Witness allowed to conduct
religious service in public place and government barred from regulating religious sermons).
52.
See Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451-52 (1969) (property dispute between two churches beyond scope of courts,
since civil courts are prohibited from interpreting or weighing church doctrine).
53.
See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (NLRB cannot condemn church
employment practices, since government review would "involve inquiry into the good faith of the
position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to [its] school's religious mission").
54.
See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (I 944) (courts cannot determine truth or
falsity of belief), rev 'don other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
55.
See Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (I 976) (Court could not
decide which bishop should lead organization because civil courts are prohibited from delving into
matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, ecclesiastical rules, custom or law).
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practices, whether as a condition to receiving benefits (as in Lemon) or as a
basis for regulation or exclusion from benefits (as here)." 56
One of the cases highlighting this principle doesn't use the word
entanglement, but describes the principle by other means. In the Watson v.
Jones case, the Court rejected the English law that gave the state ultimate
authority over ecclesiastical disputes, in favor of church autonomy over
"questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law."57
Later, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Court recognized that
even the "process of inquiry" by government into religious doctrine or
sensitive internal affairs could "impinge on rights guaranteed by the
Religion Clauses." 58 Thus, the Court refused to allow the National Labor
Relations Board even to exercise jurisdiction over lay faculty members at
two groups of religious high schools, or to order the schools to bargain with
unions on behalf of teachers. 59 The Court explained that "[t]he key role
played by teachers in such a school system has been the predicate for our
conclusions that governmental aid channeled through teachers creates an
impermissible risk of excessive governmental entanglement in the affairs of
the church-operated schools." 60 The Court further made clear that "[g]ood
intentions" of government would not "avoid entanglement with the religious
mission of the school."61
Widmar v. Vincent is another case that involves elements of both
doctrinal entanglement and government surveillance and monitoring. 62
There, the Court held that a state university could not bar student groups
from using university facilities for religious purposes. 63 Furthermore, in
response to Justice White's argument that the Establishment Clause
permitted the university to bar use of public facilities for "religious
worship" but not for "religious speech,"64 the majority held that such a
distinction would: (1) compel the university "to inquire into the significance
of words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying

56.
Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Carl H.
Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 397 (1984)).
57.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872); see also Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (First Amendment gives religious
organizations "independence from secular control or manipulation[,] ... power to decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine").
58.
NLRB, 440 U.S. at 502.
59.
Id. at 506-07.
60.
Id. at 50 I.
61.
Id. at 502.
62.
454 U.S. 263,267 (1981).
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 284 (White, J., dissenting).
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circumstances by the same faith," 65 and (2) foster "a continuing need to
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule." 66 This
monitoring would have impermissibly entangled the government in the
religious group's affairs. Thus, in these contexts, the Court was employing
entanglement to prevent against excessive government monitoring or
administrative evaluations ofreligious practices, affairs, or doctrines.
The Court just recently affirmed the relevance of entanglement analysis
in the context of church autonomy in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v.
Morrissey-Berru. 67 There, the Court affirmed the ministerial exception
principle from its 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor, which prevents
government from interfering with the employment relationship between a
religious organization and a religious leader it selects. But the Court went
on to clarify in Our Lady that courts should also refrain from deciding
whether a leader is a "co-religionist," as this would "risk judicial
entanglement in religious issues."68 Thus, the ministerial exception is a
protection that is not limited solely to "practicing" members of "the religion
with which the employer is associated."69 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch
would have gone further and said that the "broader inquiry whether an
employee's position is 'ministerial'" should be entirely off limits to the
courts because of entanglement concems. 70
C. Lemon's Prophylactic Entanglement Related to Public Support

In 1971, the Lemon v. Kurtzman Court formally established the
"excessive ... entanglement" inquiry as an official prong of the Court's
newly minted test. 71 In Lemon, the Court determined that state aid for
religious schools constituted an establishment because the aid was
conditioned on several entangling regulatory controls. 72 In efforts to prevent
an establishment, one state had imposed a system of "comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance"73 to ensure that funds
were not being used for "subject[s] ... [of] religio[n], ... morals or forms

65.
Id. at 269 n.6.
66.
Id. at 272 n.11.
67.
No. 19-267, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3547 (U.S. July 8, 2020).
68.
Id. at *39.
69.
Id. at *38.
70.
Id. at *43 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (emphasis added) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664,674 (1970)).
72.
Id. at 616.
73.
Id. at 619.
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of worship." 74 One state's program even specifically targeted Roman
Catholic schools, and no other religious private schools. 75
On the same day, the Court decided a similar case, but reached a different
conclusion. 76 In Tilton v. Richardson, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a public construction grant for a religiously affiliated college and
university facilities because such grants did not require surveillance to
prevent diversion to sectarian use. 77 Indeed, such grants were one-time,
single-purpose grants that engendered no ongoing church-state monitoring
and entanglement. 78 These cases highlighted the incorporation of the type
of monitoring problems discussed above.
From these early "excessive entanglement" cases, it also appears that the
Court was beginning to introduce a "prophylactic dimension" into its
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, particularly related to public support
of religious groups. Relationships between religious organizations and state
authorities were forbidden not only if they resulted in direct government
support of religious enterprises, but also if such relationships were
''pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction" of the
enterprises as well. 79 In some applications this "prophylactic dimension"
perhaps strengthened the "wall of separation" between church and state. On
its face, Lemon characterized this "wall" as "a blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier. " 80 Yet it also described "excessive entanglement" as a
doctrine that would tend "to corifine rather than enlarge the area of
permissible state involvement with religious institutions."81
The high-water mark of this "prophylactic dimension" within the
excessive entanglement test occurred a few years later, in Meek v.
Pittenger. 82 In Meek, the State of Pennsylvania passed a law that provided
all schools with funding for testing services, counseling and health services,
textbook loans, and other instructional materials. 83 In reviewing that law,
the Court upheld the textbook loan program, 84 but struck down the other
forms of aid. 85 The Court held that all the programs that gave aid directly to
religious schools or teachers were unconstitutional, because "[t]he State
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 615-16.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971) (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id.
lemon, 403 U.S. at 620 (emphasis added).
Id. at 614.
Id. ( emphasis added).
421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
Id. at35l-52.
Id. at 352-55.
Id. at 359---62 (plurality opinion).
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must be certain ... that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion," and
yet because "a teacher remains a teacher, ... the danger that religious
doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction persists."86 In
other words, it was unconstitutional for the State to provide religious
teachers or schools with material "which from its nature can be diverted to
religious purposes." 87 It also was unconstitutional for the State to rely "on
the good faith and professionalism of the secular teachers and counselors
functioning in church-related schools to ensure that a strictly nonideological
posture is maintained. " 88
The Court began to retreat from this particularly restrictive approach to
entanglement. Only a few years later, the Court in Roemer v. Board of
Public Works of Maryland held: "There is no exact science in gauging the
entanglement of church and state. The wording of the test, which speaks of
'excessive entanglement,' itself makes that clear." 89 Further, in RegLtn, the
Court maintained that it will not inevitably assume "bad faith upon which
any future excessive entanglement [c]ould be predicated. " 90 Despite these
initial criticisms, however, the "excessive entanglement" test continued to
function as the Court's primary tool to assess whether government
assistance programs violated the Establishment Clause for several
decades. 91
In 1973, the Court struck down a State law that reimbursed religious
schools for expenses incurred to satisfy the State's testing requirement. 92 In
that case, the Court feared that such an "inquiry would be irreversibly
frustrated if the Establishment Clause were read as permitting a State to pay
for whatever it requires a private school to do." 93 In 1977, the Court allowed
counseling services held at sites away from religious school campuses,
diagnostic services provided at the religious school campuses, and
standardized test scoring services provided at nearby public schools. 94
However, it did not allow religious schools to receive funds for their own
instructional materials or for field trips. 95 According to the Court, the State
86.
Id. at 370-71 (majority opinion) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619).
87.
Id. at 357 (emphasis added) (quoting Meek v. Pittinger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 662 (E.D. Pa.
1974)).
88.
Id. at 369.
89.
426 U.S. 736, 766-67 (1976) (emphasis omitted).
90.
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660-61 (1980).
91.
I WILLIAM J. RICH, Effects, Entanglement, and Aid to Religious Programs and Activities, in
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § I 0: 13 (3d ed. 2017).
92.
Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,482 (1973).
93.
Id.at481-82.
94.
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,255 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000).
95.
Id.
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could not provide services that could be "diverted to sectarian uses. " 96 The
Court also struck down several other programs in the 1980s, which also
fostered a "pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian
schools," and required "ongoing inspection ... to ensure the absence of a
religious message." 97
In 1997, however, the Court overruled many of these cases in Agostini v.
Felton. 98 In Agostini, Justice O'Connor wrote that the Court had
"abandoned the presumption ... that the placement of public employees on
parochial school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of
state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between
government and religion."99 This assertion therefore walked back
applications of the "excessive entanglement" test, especially any
presumption that "public employees will inculcate religion simply because
they happen to be in a sectarian environment." 100 Similarly, in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, the Court held that there is no entanglement where a state
"provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine
and independent private choice." 101
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court acknowledged some inconsistencies in
this type of entanglement application. 102 After being asked to review a
district court's finding regarding entanglement, 103 the Court decided to "not
even apply the Lemon 'test'" because it found the "line-drawing process" to
be too difficult. 104 In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist later lamented that
the Court's continued confusion about entanglement had become so
perplexing, that he wondered "whether the possibility of meeting
the entanglement test is now anything more than 'a promise to the ear to be
broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's
will.,,, i os
In its recent Espinoza decision, the Court based its decision requiring
public support for a religious school on a distinction between religious
96.
Id. at251 n.18.
97.
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997); see also Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 376--77 (1985), overruled by
Agostini, 521 U.S. 203.
98.
521 U.S. 203.
99.
Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
I 00. Id. at 234.
IOI. 536 U.S. 639,652 (2002).
102. 465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984).
103. Id.
I 04. Id. at 679.
105. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,394 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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status and religious use. 106 The Court left open some possibility that
government might restrict funds that were being put to a religious "use." 107

D. Political Entanglement
Along with establishing the "excessive entanglement" test, Lemon also
created "[a] broader base of entanglement of yet a different character" which
it defined as the "divisive political potential of the[] state programs. " 108 In
particular, the Lemon Court explained that while most "political debate and
division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy
manifestations of our democratic system," it held that "political division
along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect." 109
This doctrine took on a life of its own in later cases. For example, in
Nyquist, the Court held that "competing efforts to gain or maintain the
support of government" by religious groups had "occasioned considerable
civil strife," which conflicted with the First Amendment. 11 °Furthermore, in
Meek, the Court held that "the prospect of repeated confrontation" between
religious teachers and state officials "provide[ d] successive opportunities
for political fragmentation and division," and the attendant "danger that
religious doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction." 111
In Larson v. Valente, the Court applied the political entanglement
doctrine outside the school aid context. 112 At issue in Larson was a
Minnesota reporting law which only applied to religious organizations that
received more than half of their contributions from nonmembers. 113 In
determining that the reporting requirement was unconstitutional, the Larson
Court held that "the distinctions drawn by [the Minnesota statute], and its
fifty per cent rule 'engender a risk of politicizing religion."' 114 The Larson
· Court did not rely on the political entanglement doctrine outlined in Lemon.
Rather, it compared the 50 percent statute to the "European legacy" of
106. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 35 I 8, at *16 (U.S. June
30, 2020) ("The provision plainly excludes schools from government aid solely because of religious
status.").
107. Id. at *17-18. The Court did note, however, that "[n]one of this is meant to suggest that we
agree with the Department, ... that some lesser degree of scrutiny applies to discrimination against
religious uses of government aid." Id. at * 19 (citation omitted).
108. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 ( I 971 ).
109. Id.
110. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973).
111. Meek, 421 U.S. at 370,372.
112. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
113. Id. at 231-32.
114. Id. at 253 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
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"excessive government direction . . . of churches" "and evaluation
of ... religious content," which was expressly condemned within "the
history and logic of the Establishment Clause." 115
The political entanglement doctrine has received significant pushback,
however. As early as 1977, members of the Court were already considering
whether political division even mattered at all:
At this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the
dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment
Clause in the Bill of Rights. The risk of significant religious or
denominational control over our democratic processes---or even of
deep political division along religious lines-is [therefore]
remote .... 116
Later, in Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court also held that the mere fact that a
city sponsored a nativity scene in a way that would likely result in political
divisions along religious lines was insufficient to show entanglement. 117
Indeed, the Court explicitly explained that it has "not held that political
divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible
conduct." 1 18
Despite these rather pointed criticisms, the political entanglement
doctrine resurfaced in later cases. Justice Breyer's dissent in Zelman
contains his perspective that the Establishment Clause was created to avoid:
religious strife, not by providing every religion with an equal
opportunity (say, to secure state funding or to pray in the public
schools), but by drawing fairly clear lines of separation between
church and state-at least where the heartland of religious belief,
such as primary religious education, is at issue. 119
Justice Breyer also asserted this opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, where
he stated that political divisiveness "promotes social conflict, sapping the
strength of government and religion alike." 120 Similarly, in McCreary
County v. American Civil Liberties Union, Breyer joined an opinion stating
that the Framers "intended not only to protect the integrity of individual
115. Id. at 244,246,255 (first aleration in original).
116. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citation omitted), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000).
117. 465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984).
118. Id. at 684.
119. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 722-23 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
120. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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conscience ... but to guard against the civic divisiveness that follows when
the government weighs in on one side ofreligious debate." 121
That said, the majority in Zelman opposed Justice Breyer's argm:nents.
"We quite rightly have rejected the claim that some speculative potential for
divisiveness bears on the constitutionality of educational aid programs." 122

E. Entanglement with Public Functions
The Court has also expanded entanglement analysis to include some
contexts where religious groups have been delegated discretionary
government authority. For example, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., the
Court held that a State could not delegate authority to churches by allowing
them to ban liquor licenses from establishments within 500-feet of their
property. 123 The Court determined that part of the problem was that the
"churches' power under the statute is standardless," and also that the State
had impermissibly "substitute[d] the unilateral and absolute power of a
church for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body." 124 The
Court discussed the "entanglement implications of a statute vesting
significant governmental authority in churches," and thus "enmesh[ing]
churches in the exercise of substantial governmental powers." 125 The Court
determined that "few entanglements could be more offensive to the spirit of
the Constitution." 126
In Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, the Court similarly
pointed to the "entangling" problem of delegating important, discretionary
governmental powers to religious bodies because the state had created a
separate school district for a village that consisted of members of the Satmar
Hasidim tradition of Judaism. 127 The purpose of this school district was to
prevent "the panic, fear and trauma [the children] suffered in leaving their
own community and being with people whose ways were so different" in
normal public schools. 128 Although the Court did not treat it as dispositive
that a religious group had received a benefit, the Court held that the State
could not "single[] out a particular religious sect for special treatment." 129
Furthermore, according to Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion: "The real
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
v. Wieder,
129.

545 U.S. 844, 876 (2005).
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662 n.7; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S 793, 825 (2000).

459 U.S. 116 (1982).
Id. at 125, 127.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.
Bd. ofEduc. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 697, 708 (1994).
Id. at 692 (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist.
527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1988)).
Id. at 698, 706.
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vice of the school district . . . [was] that [the government] created it by
drawing political boundaries on the basis of religion." 130
Yet the Supreme Court has not suggested that religious groups or
individuals can never participate in public functions. In both Marsh v.
Chambers, 131 and Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court
determined that local governments could permit chaplains to open
government sessions with prayer. 132 And in Bowen v. Kendrick, 133 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a government program that
partnered with organizations "that were affiliated with religious
denominations and that had corporate requirements that the organizations
abide by religious doctrines" to provide publicly funded social services to
combat teen pregnancy. 134 The program allowed religious groups to fulfill
an important function and "expressly contemplated that some of those
moneys might go to projects involving religious groups." 135 The Court also
rejected the claim "that religious institutions are disabled by the First
Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare
programs," 136 and emphasized that a "symbolic link" between the
government and the religious organization did not constitute an improper
entanglement with religion. 137
F. A Meandering Approach to Religious Exemptions
In McDaniel v. Paty, Justice Brennan asserted that government 1s
permitted

to take religion into account when necessary to further secular
purposes unrelated to the advancement of religion, and to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish. 138
Justice Brennan viewed this as an exception to the principle that
"government may not use religion as a basis of classification for the
I 30.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
(footnotes

Id. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
572 U.S. 565 (2014).
487 U.S. 589 (1988).
Id. at 599.
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587,607 (2007) (plurality opinion).
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 609.
Id. at 613.
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)
omitted).
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imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits." 139 This was the first
clear statement of the accommodation principle in a Supreme Court
opinion. 140 Government thus need not fear entanglement with religious
beliefs simply because it removes burdens on religious exercises, even if
this requires the government to "use religion as a basis of classification" in
a way it may not do elsewhere. 141 Justice Brennan noted that such "religious
classifications" were sometimes necessary to "avoid ' [a] manifestation
of ... hostility [toward religion]"' contrary to the Free Exercise Clause. 142
The Court later explained that when accommodations are made for religion ·
in general rather than for one sect in particular, "government may (and
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so
without violating the Establishment Clause." 143
As notions of entanglement expanded under the Lemon test, the Court
seemed to walk back from this more protective view of religion. In Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., for example, the Court struck down a state law
requiring employers to accommodate work schedules of their employees. 144
The Supreme Court noted that the statute required the State Mediation
Board to decide "which religious activities may be characterized as an
'observance of Sabbath' in order to assess employees' sincerity." 145 The
Court affirmed the lower court's determination that this sort of inquiry was
"exactly the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state
surveillance' . . . which creates excessive governmental entanglements
between church and state." 146 Similarly, in Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court
struck down a state law that accommodated school children who may wish
to engage in a moment of prayer by instituting a daily moment of silence. 147
Thus, the Lemon test seemed to require courts to take a suspicious view of
religious accommodations.

139. Id.
140. McConnell, supra note 15, at 176-77.
141. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
142. Id (alterations in original) (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
211-12 (1948)).
143. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987); see also
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338
(1987) ("[T]here is ample room for accommodation ofreligion under the Establishment Clause."); Walz
v. Tax Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (holding that government may "play in the joints
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship
and without interference").
144. 472 U.S. 703, 708-10 (1985).
145. Id. at 708.
146. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 464 A.2d 785,
794 (1983)).
147. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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But the Court seems to have distanced itself again from that temporary
suspicious posture, returning to a view that religious accommodations do
not generally pose Establishment Clause problems, entanglement or
otherwise. 148 In Corp. ofPresiding Bishop v. Amos, the Court unanimously
upheld Title VII's provision that exempts religious organizations from
religious nondiscrimination requirements. 149 The Court explained that the
exemption does not "impermissibly entangle[] church and state." Rather, it
effects "a more complete separation of the two." 150 In Employment Division
v. Smith, the Court expressed a favorable view of legislative religious
exemptions, noting that "a society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in
its legislation as well." 151 Accordingly, the Court noted that permissive
religious exemptions could still be provided consistent with the First
Amendment through the "political process." 152 In Hobby Lobby, the
Supreme Court addressed the interplay between a religious exemption
statute called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the
Establishment Clause. 153 The Court rejected the position that a religious
exemption imposing externalities on others would necessarily violate the
Establishment Clause. 154 And most recently, in Little Sisters of the Poor v.
Pennsylvania, 155 the Surpeme Court upheld a religious exemption to the
contraception mandate that the Trump Administration had crafted. Justice
Alito explained in his concurrence, "[T]here is no basis for an argumentthat the new rule" offering a religious exemption "violates th[ e
Establishment] Clause." 156
Thus, with religious exemptions, the Court seems to have ended up in a
similar position where it began on this issue: assessing religious beliefs to
lift government burdens placed upon them does not result in an improper
entanglement or other sort of Establishment Clause violation.

148. McConnell, supra note 15, at 182.
149. 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987).
150. Id. at 339.
151. 494 U.S. 872,890 (1990).
152. Id.
153. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 729-30 (2014).
154. Id. at 729 n.37 ("It is certainly true that in applying RFRA 'courts must take adequate account
of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on non beneficiaries."' But such "consideration
will often inform the analysis of the Government's compelling interest and the availability of a less
restrictive means of advancing that interest" under strict scrutiny analysis. (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005))).
155. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-431, 2020 U.S.
LEXIS 3546 (U.S. July 8, 2020).
156. Id. at *61 n.13 (Alita, J., concurring).
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IL UNTANGLING THE HISTORICALLY GROUNDED ASPECTS OF
ENTANGLEMENT

The Supreme Court continues to insist that the doctrines governing
Establishment Clause questions are uniquely shaped by "specific
practice[s]" of history. 157 So if the Court does not throw out its Lemon
jurisprudence entirely-which seems unlikely-this Part provides some
preliminary thoughts on which aspects of the Court's entanglement
jurisprudence seem most defensible on historical grounds that other scholars
have identified.

A. Historically-Defensible Applications ofEntanglement
We have a few sparse records of the concept of "entanglement" being
discussed in a religious context at the founding. For example, John Adams,
like many other Americans, feared that the Church of England would
continue to exercise spiritual dominion over the former thirteen colonies
after the Revolutionary War. 158 In particular, John Adams condemned the
English tradition of allowing Parliament to "entangle [its] constitution[]
with spiritual lords," who then subjected adherents of other religious groups
to "the utmost artifices of bigotry." 159 The concept of religious
"entanglement" was used by other members of the public as well. American
Protestant pastors, for example, reviled the practice of the Anglican bishops
who "entangle[d] [themselves] with the affairs of this life" through their
authority to "intermeddle" in the affairs of all religious sects and to rule over
"civil matters." 160 Another sermon given during the founding period argued
that government must not "entangle the small" by binding the consciences
of men and "prescribing creeds and making acts of conformity." 161 These
early ·clergy were demanding that the government allow them to "stand on
even ground," as well as to "equally enjoy their religious opinions, ...
157. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014). As of 2006, "76% of the Justices
who have written at least one Religion Clause opinion have appealed to history [i.e., specific founders
or the founding era], and every one of the twenty-three Justices who authored more than four Religion
Clause opinions have done so." Hall, supra note 16, at 572.
158. Morgan W. Patterson, The Contributions of Baptists to Religious Freedom in America, 73
REV. & EXPOSITOR 23 (1976).
159. John Adams, Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States ofAmerica, in
6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE
AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 3, 119 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851).
160. NOAH WELLES, VINDICATION OF THE VALIDITY AND DIVINE RIGHT OF PRESBYTERIAN
ORDINATION 138 (T. Collier. ed., 1796).
161. TIMOTHY DWIGHT, A SERMON PREACHED AT NORTHAMPTON ON THE TWENTY-EIGHTH OF
NOVEMBER 1781: 0CCAISONED BY THE CAPTURE OF THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER THE COMMAND OF
EARL CORNWALLIS 17, 31-32 (Nov. 28, 1781).
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without molestation, or being exposed to fines and forfeitures or to any
temporal disadvantages." 162 Thus, at least these records suggest an idea of
entanglement linked to government control over religion and intermeddling
with religious practices and the conscience of individuals.
These sorts of discussions track some of the hallmarks of an
establishment that Professor Michael McConnell has identified, including
government control over church doctrine, governance, and personnel, and
prohibitions on worship in dissenting churches. 163 In this vein, Professor
John Witte has explained that establishing Anglicanism in England "led to
all manner of state controls of the internal affairs of the established
Church." 164 Some of the Court's current entanglement jurisprudence falls
within these hallmarks.
For example, the Court's case law cautioning against government
monitoring or interference with church administration or doctrine helps
protect the autonomy and religious integrity of institutions. These cases,
including Walz, 165 Watson v. Jones, 166 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 167 Widmar, 168 and Our Lady of Guadalupe Schoo/ 169 are consistent
with a historical approach. Perhaps the reasoning of some of these cases
could be recast-it is unnecessary, for example, that the Court employ the
"entanglement" moniker to arrive at these results. But continuing the use of
entanglement analysis at least in this context would find rich support in
historical sources.
The performance of public functions appears to be another area where
entanglement analysis is historically justified, but this point should not be
overstated. As I have written elsewhere, 170 historical sources do not reflect
widespread establishment concerns about churches performing civil
functions at all. Indeed, some charitable works originally performed by
churches-like caring for orphans--did not even become civil functions the
government took on until long after churches had been performing them as

162. HENRY CUMINGS, A SERMON PREACHED AT BILLERICA DECEMBER 15, 1796, BEING THE
DAY APPOINTED BY AUTHORITY, TO BE OBSERVED THROUGHOUT THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS AS A DAY OF PUBLIC PRAISE AND THANKSGIVING 13 (Dec. 15, 1796).
163. McConnell, supra note 11, at 2131.
164. JOHN WITTE JR., GOD'S JOUST, GOD'S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN
TRADlTION 186 (2006).
165. 397 U.S. 664,680 (1970).
166. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872).
167. 440 U.S. 490,502 (1979).
168. 454 U.S. 263,267 (1981).
169. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, No. 19-267, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3547 (U.S.
July 8, 2020).
170. Stephanie H. Barclay et al., Original Meaning and the Establishment Clause: A Corpus
Linguistics Analysis, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 505,557 (2019).
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a ministry. 171 But religious performance of public functions did become
problematic when the church was given preferential treatment or monopoly
power over the function. For example, in the early republic, an article in a
newspaper called the Pennsylvania Journal expressed concern about a law
that only allowed members of an established church in England to teach in
schools. The law also prevented parents from sending their children to a
religious school consistent with the parents' religious beliefs. 172
Thus, establishment restrictions were created both to disallow
government's ability "to control and harness religion in service of the
state," 173 as well as the church's ability to control and harness the state in
service of one religion. 174 As a result, the Court's entanglement decisions in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 175 Bowen v. Kendrick, 176 andEspinoza 177 seem
historically sound. These decisions approve government partnerships with
religious groups to perform public functions so long as beneficiaries have
various options and real choice in the matter. 178
B. Dubious Applications of Entanglement
Other aspects of the Court's entanglement jurisprudence seem much
further afield from historical justifications. These include the anti-sectarian
concerns about any sort of public funding to support religion, monitoring
issues that are problems of the Court's own making, fear of political
divisiveness, and concerns about religious exemptions.
To begin with, the Court's rhetoric expressing concern about aid to any
religious groups (even in an even-handed way) can be traced back to the

\

171. Private religious organizations largely developed the adoption and foster care system. See E.
Wayne Carp, Introduction: A Historical Overview of American Adoption, in ADOPTION IN AMERICA:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES I, 3-4 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 2002); see also ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY
DESIGN: A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE MODERN UNITED STATES 60, 125 (2008); BARBARA MELOSH,
STRANGERS AND KIN: THE AMERICAN WAY OF ADOPTION 15 (2002); Paula F. Pfeffer, A Historical
Comparison of Catholic and Jewish Adoption Practices in Chicago, 1833-1933, in ADOPTION IN
AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES,supra, at 101, 103-05.
172. See The Remonstrant, No. IV, PA. J., Nov. 3, 1768, reprinted in COLLECTION OF TRACTS
FROM THE LATE NEWS PAPERS, &C. 83, 85 (1769) ("[T]he Toleration Act ... deprived all parents that
were not of the established Church, of the great trust committed to them by GOD, and nature, to train
up their own children according to their own sentiments in religion, and the fear of GOD. No catechism
was to be taught to children, but that of the Church of England, and no man under severe penalties, was
allowed to teach even an English school, who did not, in all things, conform to that Church. Let our
Anatomist call this unmerited abuse .... ").
173. McConnell, supra note 11, at 2208.
174. Barclay et al., supra note 170, at 557.
175. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
176. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
177. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3518 (U.S. June 30,
2020).
178.

Id. at 615-17; Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63.
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Court's first entanglement decision in McCollum, in which it praised
policies such as Blaine Amendments. 179 Scholars have thoroughly
canvassed the fact that this concern about any financial support of
"sectarian" education was linked to a groundswell of nativist opposition to
any governmental support for the Catholic Church. 180 Massive Catholic
immigration in the mid- l 800s created friction, and no "area of disagreement
between Protestants and Catholics caused more friction than the place of
religion in the public schools." 181 The 1844 "Bible Riots" in Philadelphia
left more than fifty people dead (and many more injured) and destroyed
Catholic Churches. 182 In 1859, Boston expelled 400 Catholic students for
refusing to say the Lord's Prayer. 183
In its actual application, anti-sectarian didn't really mean no aid for
religion. As Noah Feldman has explained, "the theorists of the common
schools thought that the schools must impart some foundational moral
values to promote civic virtues and believed that those moral values must
derive in some way from Christian religion." 184 "Non-sectarianism, it was
thought, would . . . enable the state to take a stance in favor of broadly
shared, foundational Christian values." 185 Horace Mann, the leader of the
common schools movement, argued that common schools "should teach the
'fundamental principles of Christianity. "' 186 A nonsectarian school
"earnestly inculcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis
of religion; it welcomes the religion of the Bible." 187 He also stated, "In
every course of studies, all the practical and preceptive parts of the Gospel
179. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,218 n.6 (1948).
180. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 193-251 (Harv. Univ. Press
paperback ed. 2004); Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious
Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493 (2003); Nathan S. Chapman, Forgotten Federal-Missionary
Partnerships: New Light on the Establishment Clause (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 2019-34, 2019).
181. Vincent P. Lannie, Alienation in America: The Immigrant Catholic and Public Education in
Pre-Civil War America, 32 REV. POL. 503,507 (1970).
182. Frank S. Ravitch, A Crack in the Wall: Pluralism, Prayer, and Pain in the Public Schools,
in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 296,298 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Vincent P.
Lannie & Bernard C. Diethom, For the Honor and Glory of God: The Philadelphia Bible Riots of 1840,
8 HIST. EDUC. Q. 44, 75-76 (1968).
183. STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CLASH THAT
SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE 40 (2012). Nevada's Blaine Amendment was enacted in
response to public funding of a Catholic orphanage. A Much Needed Amendment, DAILY NEV. TRIB.
(Carson City), Feb. 21, 1877 ("[This] is a stepping stone to the final breaking up of a power that has
long cursed the world, and that is obtaining too much of a foothold in these United States.").
184. Noah Feldman, Non-Sectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J.L & POL. 65, 67 (2002).
185. Id. at 66.
186. GREEN, supra note 183, at 21.
187. HORACE MANN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION, in TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION TOGETHER WITH THE
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD 13, 117 (1849).
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should have been sacredly included; and all dogmatical theology and
sectarianism sacredly excluded." 188 In other words, the historical roots of
anti-sectarian rhetoric really supported preferential public support for
certain religious beliefs-precisely the type of preferentialism the
Establishment Clause was meant to prevent against.
Furthermore, as I and other scholars have argued elsewhere, the
historical evidence does not support a conclusion that at the founding period
any form of public support for religious organizations was viewed as
equivalent to an establishment of religion. 189 Rather, public support became
problematic if it involved public support given in a way that preferred
established churches to other congregations, 190 or resembled a coerced
church tithe in that it was a special earmarked tax directly given to
churches. 191 For example, regarding preferential public support, Rhode
Island Pastor Ezra Stiles in his 1760 discourse at the Convention of the
Congregational Clergy details that specific financial advantage was given
exclusively to the established church. He stated, "In Maryland and Virginia
it is episcopacy [that is established], with appropriations of large revenues
from tobacco for the established clergy only." 192 Similarly, in a 1774
pamphlet, Thomas Bradbury Chandler stated,
An established religion, is a religion which the civil authority
engages, not only to protect, but to support; and a religion that is not
provided for by the civil authority, but which is left to provide for
itself, or to subsist on the provision it has already made, can be no
more than a tolerated religion. 193

188. HORACE MANN, GO FORTH AND TEACH: AN ORATION DELIVERED BEFORE THE
AUTHORITIES OF THE ClTY OF BOSTON, JULY 4, 1842 (July 4, 1842), reprinted in GO FORTH AND TEACH:
AN ORATION DELIVERED BEFORE THE AUTHORITIES OF THE CITY OF BOSTON BY HORACE MANN ALSO
OTHER MATERIALS RELATING TO HIS LIFE 1, 44-45 (Comm. on the Horace Mann Centennial Nat'J
Educ. Ass'n 1937).
189. Barclay et al., supra note 170, at 557. For an excellent discussion of the types of church taxes
that were concerning during the founding period, as opposed to those that were not, see Mark Storslee,
Church Taxes and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 169 U. PENN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021).
190. Barclay et al., supra note 170, at 558 ("[O]ur results always involved public support given in
a way that preferred established churches to other congregations. Sometimes government compounded
the problem by leveraging that support to try to control church leadership or doctrine of the established
church.").
191. Id. at 544, 548-49; see generally Storslee, supra note 189.
192. EZRA STILES, A DISCOURSE ON THE CHRISTIAN UNION: THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS
DELIVERED BEFORE THE REVEREND CONVENTION OF THE CONGREGATIONAL CLERGY 99 (Apr. 23,
1760).
193. THOMAS BRADBURY CHANDLER, A FRIENDLY ADDRESS TO ALL REASONABLE AMERICANS,
ON THE SUBJECT OF OUR POLITICAL CONFUSIONS 55 (N.Y., James Rivington 1774).
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As for mandatory church tithes, John Murray stated in 1764 that the
colonies "made an attempt to get themselves eased of the burden of tithes,
which they could not conscientiously pay, and for refusal of which they
have so greatly suffered." 194 If public support ofreligious groups in general
was viewed as a problematic hallmark of an establishment, one would
expect to see more concerns raised about things like tax exemptions or land
grants. But the opposite is true. 195
The ahistorical approach the Court has taken to concerns about religious
groups receiving funds to use for religious purposes gave rise to secondary
ahistorical issues about entanglement necessary to monitor the use of funds.
In Lemon itself, the government believed that state aid for religious schools
must be conditioned on several entangling regulatory controls, including
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" to
ensure that funds were not being used for "any subject matter expressing
religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect." 196 Given
previous precedent expressing concern about public support of religion, the
government had a reasonable concern that it could not just give money to
religious schools without strings attached. But then these strings themselves
became an entanglement problem.
To be sure, this sort of monitoring is problematic. But it is only needed
because of anti-sectarian skepticism of giving support to churches even if
support is even-handed. Chief Justice Rehnquist attacked the illogic of this
position. "[T]he 'Catch-22' paradox of its own creation," results in a
situation "whereby aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but
the supervision itself is held to cause an entanglement." 197 Were we to
remove the primary problem, the idea that even-handed public support of
religious groups is an entanglement, we would avoid the secondary
monitoring entanglement issue as well. In its recent Espinoza decision, the
Court based its decision requiring public support for a religious school on a
distinction between religious status and religious use. 198 The Court left open
194. 4 JAMES MURRAY, THE HISTORY OF RELIGION: PARTICULARLY OF THE PRINCIPAL
DENOMINATIONS OF CHRISTIANS 240 (London, C. Henderson et al. 1764); see also Barclay et al., supra
note 170, at 548-49.
195. "So ingrained was the practice of land grants for the support of religion that when
Congress ... organize[d] settlement of the Northwest Territory, its first two substantial grants specified
that a section in each township would be set apart for the support of religion, along with one for
education." McConnell, supra note 11, at 2150; see also Chapman, supra note 180.
196. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-21 (1971).
197. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420--21 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109-110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
198. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3518, at *16 (U.S. June
30, 2020) ("The provision plainly excludes schools from government aid solely because of religious
status.").
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some possibility that government might restrict funds that were being put to
a religious "use." 199 Notably, if the Court does allow government to
discriminate against religious use of funds, and thus monitor the use of those
funds, this may raise some of the entangling concerns that first gave rise to
Lemon's central holding in the school context. The inability to draw clean
lines between status and use was a reason Justice Gorusch criticized reliance
on this distinction. 200 But the heightened risk of government entanglement
may be another reason for the Court to eschew this distinction altogether.
As to political entanglement, other scholars have argued that there is no
factual basis for the view that the Framers of the Constitution believed that
"political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect."201 This iteration of
entanglement is famously difficult to apply or predict. Indeed, sometimes
courts have incorrectly found political divisiveness when it has been caused
by a lawsuit rather than the religious activity itself. 202
And finally, concerns about entanglement related to government
provision of religious exemptions similarly are unsupported by the weight
of the historical evidence. As I have written elsewhere, along with other
scholars, 203 this argument is not a persuasive account of the Supreme
Court's current Establishment Clause doctrine or the historical
underpinnings of that provision. Indeed, there are widespread examples of
exemptions at the Founding, including for Quakers from the draft or other
groups from oaths. 204 And there is no evidence that these exemptions were
199. Id. at * 17-18. The Court did note, however, that "[ n Jone of this is meant to suggest that we
agree with the Department, ... that some lesser degree of scrutiny applies to discrimination against
religious uses of government aid." Id. at * 19 ( citation omitted).
200. Id. at *58-64 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
201. Leman, 403 U.S. at 622; see, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 14. For an in-depth analysis of why
political divisiveness should not inform the interpretation of the Establishment Clause, see Richard W.
Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006).
202. Stephanie Barclay, Note, Passive Acknowledgement or Active Promotion of Religion?
Neutrality and the Ten Commandments in Green v. Haskell, 2010 BYU L. REV. 3, 13-15.
203. See, e.g., Stephanie Barclay, First Amendment "Harms," 95 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2020);
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103 (2015);
Marc 0. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 SAN DlEGO L. REV. 105 (2016); Carl H. Esbeck,
When Religious Exemptions Cause Third-Party Harms: Is the Establishment Clause Violated?, 59 J.
CHURCH & ST. 357 (2016); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of
Religion, 67 V AND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 45 (2014); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, ThirdParty Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 1383-84 (2016); Mark
Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 871 (2019); Marc DeGirolami, Holt v. Hobbs and the Third-Party-Harm Establishment Clause
Theory, MIRROR JUST. (Oct. 7, 2014), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2014/l 0/wherehas-the-establishment-clause-third-party-harm-argument-gone.html [https://perma.ccfX7SH-NBHP].
204. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1467-73 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990).
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viewed as tantamount to an establishment of religion. Thus, though the
Supreme Court took a detour away from historical evidence when it decided
cases such as Caldor, its current jurisprudence about exemptions seems to
have returned to an approach consistent with the historical evidence.
III. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In its recent American Legion decision, the Supreme Court strongly
suggested that the three-prong Lemon test is essentially dead letter. If one is
using a historical approach for the Establishment Clause, then disregarding
the first two prongs of the Lemon test certainly makes sense. Many scholars
have observed that these aspects of the test appear to have been created
whole cloth by a judiciary unconcerned with historical origins of the
Establishment Clause. But what of the entanglement prong of the test? This
Article cautions that rejecting all applications of entanglement analysis,
would risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
A close analysis of the Court's entanglement jurisprudence, compared
against historical support for the various applications, suggests that
entanglement jurisprudence ought to remain good law in at least two
contexts. First, where it has protected religious groups from government
interference with the autonomy, internal affairs, and administration. Second,
where it prevents government from treating certain religious groups in a
preferential way, including by granting monopoly power in the performance
of public functions. These lines of cases find more historical support for the
types of government actions the Establishment Clause was ratified to protect
against. While the Court need not continue to root this form of analysis
under an "entanglement" label, this jurisprudence should remain good law.
On the other hand, the Court's entanglement precedent is on far shakier
historical ground in several contexts, including anti-sectarian skepticism of
any sort of government aid to religious groups (and accompanying
monitoring requirements to avoid_ religious use of funds), concerns about
political divisiveness when government interacts with religious groups, and
opposition to government classifications necessary to provide religious
exemptions.
If the Court were to modify its entanglement analysis to disregard
ahistorical applications and embrace the historical ones, the upshot is this:
Many ways in which the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
have seemed to be in tension would fade away. Instead, both Religion
Clauses would work together harmoniously to prevent problematic
government interference with religious groups or preferential treatment of
some religions, while still allowing government to even-handedly partner
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with and support religious groups. Such an interpretation could facilitate an
increase in religious pluralism and human flourishing and a decrease in
unnecessary cultural fights aimed at excluding religion from the public
sphere.

